Seal: when you upload a PDF, we hold it in memory just long enough to compute its digest, embed the hybrid signature, and stream the sealed file back. The original bytes are dropped — we do not write them to disk and we do not retain a cached copy. The audit record contains the hash, the two signature values, the RFC 3161 token, and the certificate chain. Cross-tenant queries are blocked at the data-access layer.
Vault: encrypted envelope blobs are retained so recipients can decrypt later, but they are AES-256-GCM ciphertext encrypted under a per-document data key that we ourselves cannot recover without the recipient's authentication. Per-recipient wrapped keys live next to the audit row. Recipient private keys are envelope-encrypted under a hardware-backed key alias; Enterprise tenants can BYOK to their own key-management infrastructure so we never see the unwrapping key in plaintext.
Sign: the in-flight PDF is encrypted under the sender tenant's hybrid envelope and rotates after every signer applies their PAdES B-LT signature. Per-signer audit rows capture the email, IP, user-agent, and signing timestamp. Once the last signer finishes we attach the final workspace PQC seal, retain the completed sealed PDF for sender retrieval, and drop all intermediate envelopes.
My Vault: same hybrid envelope as Vault, but the data key is wrapped under the tenant's own X25519 + ML-KEM-768 bundle instead of a recipient's. Files (any type, up to 100 MB) are retrieved from any workspace device after sign-in. Items marked passphrase-protected get an additional zero-knowledge layer the platform itself cannot decrypt.
The Certificate of Sealing PDF — a human-readable summary linked from the public verifier — is the only PDF we retain for the Seal product. It contains no part of your original document and can be deleted on request.
